Empirical evidence shows that the value of units in a building generally rises with their floor level due to features such as the better view and lesser noise experienced in higher stories. We adopt a theoretical approach for examining the value of units in different floors based on the allocation of land and construction cost among the stories of the building. Relying on cooperative game theory analysis, we propose the Shapley value approach as a mechanism for allocating these costs. We examine the allocation mechanism and derive several closed-form properties by which the value pattern of stories in a building is rationalized. Furthermore, following Lakoff and Johnson (1980), we argue that agents achieve greater status from occupying higher stories because of inherent cognitive motives. We thus constitute the Relative L&J Status function and formally show that its properties coincide with those of the difference between the costs allocated to any two stories in the building, thereby, derive a new property to the Shapley solution. Finally, we empirically test the derived Shapley cost allocation properties and the attained results are consistent with our major predictions.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom and existing empirical economic literature assert that the value of (otherwise identical) housing units in a building increases with their floor level. This phenomenon is generally explained by features such as the better view and lesser noise experienced in higher stories. 1 We propose a more fundamental aspect that rationalizes the price pattern of stories in buildings. This aspect, as will soon be clarified, stands at an intersection of cost allocation arguments that rely on both Shapley's solution to cooperative games [see Shapley (1953) ] and Lakoff and Johnson's insight to orientational perceptions [see Lakoff and Johnson (1980) -hereafter, L&J] .
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The framework we establish effectively proposes a normative-cost allocation based-ruling for the relative prices of stories in buildings. Particularly, it suggests a mechanism for allocating the land and construction cost among any number of stories that collectively constitute a given building. 3 Moreover, it offers a resolution to various puzzles in housing economics such as the willingness to pay different prices for identical units located on the same story of buildings that only differ in their number of stories.
The intuition for applying the Shapley approach for the allocation of the land and construction costs emerges from the observation according to which the construction of the higher stories in the building is utterly contingent upon the construction of the lower ones, while the construction of lower stories does not require the construction of the higher ones. 4 Hence, a cooperative game among the stories of the building arises.
A complementary rationale for the proposed cost allocation mechanism follows from L&J. By analyzing orientational metaphors, L&J argue and demonstrate that, normally, "up" (that is, higher stories in our case) associates with all that is perceived as positive, while "down" (lower stories in our case) connotes with everything, which is perceived as negative.
L&J demonstrate the manifestation of this phenomenon in the language. Several of the numerous examples are: happy is up and sad is down (as, for example, in "I'm feeling up," "He is low these days"); conscious is up and unconscious is down ("Wake up," "He fell asleep"); health and life are up and sickness and death are down ("Lazarus rose from the dead," "He fell ill"); having control or force is up and being subject to control or force is down ("I'm on top of the situation," "He's under my control"); more is up and less is down ("My income rose last year," "The number of errors he made is low"); high status is up and low status is down ("He has little upward mobility," "He's at the bottom of social hierarchy"); good is up and bad is down ("Things are looking up,"
"We hit a peak last year, but it's been downhill ever since"); virtue is up and depravity is down ("She is high-minded," "That would be beneath me"); and, finally, rational is up and emotional is down ("I raised the discussion back up to the rational plane," "He couldn't rise above his emotions").
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It follows from L&J that, ceteris paribus, the higher the floor one occupies, the more one is perceived (by oneself and others) to be happy, healthy, lively, good, rational, having control and force, having more, being in high status, etc. In other words, from a cognitive perspective (which may be either conscious or unconscious) occupying a higher story in a building is commonly preferred to occupying a lower one. 6 L&J thus rationalize the motivation for occupying higher stories, namely, that the relative status associated with a given story rises (falls) with the number of stories below (above) it.
the entrepreneur due to the accompanying commitment to build all stories underneath, even if the realized demand is weak. 5 In the context of our framework and following L&J, it is not surprising that, for example, the management level of many organizations frequently resides on the top floor of the building or, alternatively, if the organization does not have access to the top floor, then it is the highest available story that populates the management level (as commonly heard among peers: "I'm going up to the management level…"). While it is commonly believed that management acquires the highest possible floor due to the more attractive landscape, it follows from L&J that another important motivation corresponds to the cognitive connotations of the terms "up" and "down." 6 Of course, the high (low) story receives its positive (negative) connotation from being higher (lower) than the stories underneath (above). This implies that, for example, occupying a top floor of a building with lower stories underneath is more valuable than occupying a floor with the same height, however, with no stories below.
In the general economic literature and specifically in the cooperative game theory literature, a number of methods have been proposed for allocating costs (utilities) among players within coalitions. Notably, Shapley (1953) presents a solution to the allocation problem that both conforms to conditions of fairness and is unique. Because of the inherent interdependence among stories in the case of vertical construction, we adopt the Shapley value approach by which we propose a mechanism for allocating the land and construction cost among the stories in the building.
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According to the Shapley solution, the cost distributed to each story rises with the story's level in the building in a particular way. In fact, as it turns out, each floor bears only its true pro rata share in the total cost associated with its construction.
Specifically, the cost of those elements in the building that commonly and equally serve all stories in the building (those element that embrace the fixed cost such as land, foundations of the structure, common infrastructure, etc.) and the marginal construction cost of the first floor are equally divided among all stories. However, the marginal construction cost of the second floor is equally allocated only among the floors beyond the first, and more generally, the marginal cost of the n-th floor is distributed only among the stories beyond the (n-1)-th floor.
Shapley (1953) 8 shows that the proposed solution conforms to the following properties: a) efficiency, i.e. the sum of the individual cost allocated to each player equals the total cost; b) symmetry, i.e. players that identically affect the cost function for every coalition bear the same cost; c) dummy player, i.e. players that do not affect the cost function for every coalition bear no cost; and d) additivity, i.e. for a given set of players, Shapley (1964) , Aumann and Shapely (1974) , Aumann (1975), and Mas-Colell (1977) ]. 10 (eyal, I can't find the exact references -we need to add them! Moreover, within the context of real estate, the availability of transaction (market) prices is often limited and thus the Shapley mechanism may generate prices when those are unobservable (correspondingly, an organization with several profit centers that are located on different stories of a building may use the Shapley mechanism to determine the rent cost allocation). Also, because of its fairness and efficiency properties, the Shapley cost allocation may provide a benchmark for the fair and efficient allocation. As previously mentioned, this allocation further exhibits properties that are consistent with relative status.
It should be noted that the Shapley solution has been applied to several practical problems in economics where allocation among players in coalitions is involved. 8 For an extensive survey of the Shapley value literature, see, for example, Roth (1988) . Also, more on the interpretations of the Shapley axioms in a context similar to ours, see Dubey (1992) . 9 We propose here a somewhat different approach to the formulation of status than those existing in the literature. See the methodologies in, for example, Fershtman and Weiss (1993) , Quint and Shubik (2001a , 2001b ), and Luttmer (2004 . 10 Also, see Hart Notably, Littlechild and Thompson (1977) show that the Shapley value approach to the allocation of the common costs of runway construction and landing fees highly resembles the actual charges employed at Birmingham airport during the investigated period (the years 1968-1969) .
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In Section 2 we derive the Shapley value mechanism for allocating the land and construction cost and examine its properties both in closed-form and by simulation. In Section 3 we develop the Relative L&J Status function associated with the occupancy of different stories in the building and link its properties to the Shapley cost allocation solution. In section 4 we empirically test the major predictions derived under the theoretical framework. We summarize in Section 5.
The Shapley Solution of the Land and Construction Cost Allocation
Consider an N-story building. Let FC be the fixed cost associated with the construction of the entire structure. This cost consists of land, foundations, infrastructure, and all other elements that equally serve all the units in the building, independently of their specific vertical location in the building. 12 Further, denote the marginal cost that corresponds to the construction of story i by mc(i), i=1,…,N.
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It follows that for any N-story building, the total cost to be allocated among the different floors TC{N}, is
11 More on the Shapley approach to the allocation of runway construction costs, see Littlechild and Owen (1973) . Also, Loehman and Whinston (1971) present a pricing scheme for public utilities that, although not derived by the Shapley mechanism, bears some resemblance-as noted by the authors-to the Shapley solution. Finally, theoretical research in real estate economics that also examines aspects of construction includes Sullivan (1989) and, more generally, on the economics of construction see, for example, Vandell and Lane (1989) and Hysom and Crawford (1997) . 12 Other than the cost of placing the foundations and of setting up the common infrastructure, the fixed cost function, FC, might also include, for example, the cost of building various facilities for the common and equal service of all occupants. Note, however, that the fixed cost function may, in general, be discontinuous. E.g., while one stairway often suffices a 10-story building, additional floors might eventually necessitate the construction of another stairway. Similarly, the foundations laid for a 10-story building are likely to be less costly than those required for a 50-story structure. Therefore, in FC we only include those costs that involve the construction of elements that commonly and equally serve all stories and units in the structure. Other costs are to be included in the marginal cost component. 13 Following the previous footnote, mc(i) thus represents both the specific marginal cost associated with the construction of the individual story as well as the average cost that corresponds to the construction of the additional group of stories to which floor i belongs. If, for example, any additional group of 10 stories requires the construction of another stairway, then mc(i) equals both the particular marginal cost of constructing the i-th floor as well as one-tenth of the total cost of constructing another stairway.
where we also assume that
where S is any possible coalition of stories in the building and i, i=1,…,N, denotes a specific story in the building.
14 Equation (1) implies that the total cost associated with the construction of a building simply equals the combination of fixed cost (cost of land, foundations, infrastructures, etc.) and marginal cost (incremental cost that corresponds to each additional story). Equation (2) guarantees that zero floors convey zero costs, and Equation (3) together with Equation (4) state that the total cost of constructing any subset of floors is equal to the total cost of constructing the highest floor within the subset.
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Following Shapley (1953) , the Shapley value assigned to story j, ϕ j , in an N-story building is defined by
where s is the number of stories in subset S and ϕ j is the Shapley value associated with story j.
The Shapley value that corresponds to story j, ϕ j , can be interpreted as the expectation of the marginal contribution of the j-th story to the total construction cost, where the distribution of coalitions (any possible demanded sub-group of stories) arises in a particular way. To get a sense for ϕ j , one can assume that the demand for floors may appear in any arbitrary order and that all N! orderings are equally likely. Then, ϕ j is the expected value, across all possible orderings, of story j's marginal contribution to the total construction cost.
We now use the solution of Littlechild and Owen (1973) to re-write Equation (5).
It should be noted, however, that our cost structure includes a fixed cost element, which is omitted from the setup of Littlechild and Owen (1973) . Yet, since the fixed cost in our framework is used for factors that equally serve all occupants in the building, we get that for the cost function presented in Equations (1)- (4), the Shapley value in Equation (5) can be simplified into
which can be further simplified into (j=2,…,N, and i=1,…,N-1) . We define the ratio between the cost allocated to the j-th story and that allocated to the i-th story according to the Shapley solution by R (j,i,N) and the difference between the cost allocated to the j-th story and that allocated to the i-th
Following Equations (1), (6), and (7), we argue
.,N, then both R(j,i,N) and D(j,i,N) increase with j and decrease with i, ceteris paribus.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that, according to the Shapley value approach to allocating the land and construction cost, the total cost of an N-story building is simply allocated to each story according to its vertical location in the building: the higher the floor in the building, the greater its allocated cost. The ratio and the difference functions provide a practical tool for comparing the floor price among different stories and buildings.
It further follows from Equation (7) that each floor carries the true pro rata cost associated with its construction: the cost associated with constructing the first floor is simply its fair share in FC and mc(1). However, since the construction of the second floor relies on the construction of the first floor, the cost associated with the second floor is its fair share in FC, mc(1), and mc(2). More generally, the cost associated with the construction of the j-th floor is its fair share in FC, mc(1), mc(2), and up to mc(j).
It thus turns out that the costs FC and mc(1) are equally divided among all stories in the building, mc (2) is divided among all stories from the second and beyond, and mc (j) is divided among all stories from the j-th and beyond.
For example, suppose N=3. Then, according to the Shapley value in Equations (6) and (7), the cost allocated to the first floor, ϕ 1 , is 16 As previously discussed, an alternative approach for attaining this cost allocation is to average story j's marginal contribution to the total construction cost across all possible orderings. For example, for the N=3 case:
Cost Allocated to Story:
In Figure 1 in the appendix, we demonstrate the costs allocated among the stories in a 50-story building. We compare the cost allocation for different shares of fixed cost,
FC.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the total cost of construction of the 50-story building (including land cost) is fixed at 100 million dollars. One can see that while the allocated cost curve always rises with the story level, the curve flattens as the share of the fixed cost increases.
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In the remaining of the analysis we assume that mc(i)=mc(j)=mc≠0 for all i,j=1,…,N. We now claim R(j+1,j,N) increases (decreases) with j, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 3: D(j+1,j,N) monotonically increases with j, ceteris paribus.
Interestingly, Proposition 2 entails that despite the fact that the Shapley value approach monotonically allocates greater land and construction cost to higher stories, the percentage change between the costs allocated to any two consecutive floors is not monotonic. In fact, in the general case, the ratio between the costs allocated to two successive stories first falls and then rises as one climbs along the floors of a given structure.
Moreover, the minimum of the ratio function between the costs allocated to any two successive stories is attained at the lowest j-th floor that sustains
In Figure 2 in the appendix, we demonstrate the additional cost allocated to any floor compared to that allocated to the preceding one (measured in percentage of the cost Also, note that the attained Shapley allocation is in the core of this cooperative game. That is, no coalition of stories can "gain" by dismissing this cost allocation and solely assume its cost of construction. 17 A simple computation indicates that when the land cost captures 50% of the total cost, and further, when the cost of the foundations, infrastructure, etc. capture 50% of the remaining cost, then FC carries altogether 75% of the total land and construction cost of the building. allocated to the preceding floor) for a 50-story building. The results are simulated and presented for a fixed cost share of 25%, 50%, and 75% of the total cost.
One can see that the percent change in the cost allocated to any floor relative to the previous one is contingent upon the share of the fixed cost. For example, while the function monotonically increases when the fixed cost share equals 50% and 75%, it first falls and then rises for a fixed cost share of 25%. 18 We further argue and D(j,i,N) converges to zero.
Proposition 4: When N is large (i.e. for tall buildings), then R(j,i,N) converges to
) / ( ) / ( mc FC i mc FC j + +
Proposition 5:
The land and construction cost allocated to the j-th story converges to
Proposition 5 thus provides a quick and simple method for computing the cost to be allocated to each story according to the Shapley value approach.
Note that the difference H(N)-H(N-j) that appears in Equation (A19) increases
with j at a relatively slow pace, implying that while the land and construction cost allocated to each story monotonically rises with the story's level, the growth is relatively slow.
We further examine the effect of the number of stories in the building on the derived Shapley solution. We claim 18 Moreover, in a realistic case in which FC carries 75% of the total land and construction cost, the difference in the cost allocated to any two consecutive stories in the first 40 stories of the building is between 0.68% and 2.03%. These figures grow slowly to a 5.88% difference between the 47-th and 48-th stories, and finally jump to 15.39% difference between the 50-th (top story) and the 49-th stories. One can see that, independently of the share of the fixed cost, the average percent change in the cost allocated to all couplets of successive stories falls with the number of stories in the building. Furthermore, as we increase the share of the fixed cost, the average percent change in the cost allocated to all couplets of successive floors falls for any given building height.
Also,
Proposition 9: For all levels of FC≠0, both R(j, i, N) and D(j, i, N) We assume that the Relative L&J Status function, S (j,i,N) , is defined for all whole numbers, j, i, and N, where N≥j>i≥1 and that its range are positive numbers. We then require that S(·) conforms to the following three axioms: In other words, that relocating from a lower story to a higher one supplements the same level of L&J status independently whether the shift is performed directly from one floor to another or indirectly via an intermediate floor.
Axiom 2 requires that the Relative L&J Status function is marginally increasing.
That is, that the additional status produced by any given shift from a lower to a higher story rises as the relocation commences at a higher story in the building. Following the above three Axioms, we claim
Corollary: For all k=1,2,…, Axioms 1-3 imply that S(j+k,i,N)>S(j,i,N), S(j,i+k,N)<S(j,i,N), and S(j,i,N)>S(j,i,N+k).

Proof: Axiom 1 combined with the fact that S(·) is positive implies that
S(j+k,i,N)>S(j,i,N). Also, note that Axiom 1 can be re-expressed as
S(j,i,N)=S(j,i+k,N)+S(i+k,i,N) for all k=1,2,…,j-i, however, the latter together with the fact that S(·) is positive implies that S(j,i,N)>S(j,i+k,N). Finally, Axiom 2 together with Axiom 3 implies that for all k=1,2,…, S(j+k,i+k,N+k)<S(j+k,i+k,N) and hence
S(j,i,N+k)<S(j,i,N).
Note that the properties of S(·) stated in the Corollary are consistent with L&J:
S(j+k,i,N)>S(j,i,N) and S(j,i+k,N)<S(j,i,N) for all k=1,2,… imply that the relatively higher
is the j-th story compared to the i-th story, the greater (worse) the Relative L&J Status experienced by the occupant of the j-th (i-th) story. Furthermore, S(j,i,N)>S (j,i,N+k) 20 This implies that relocating from one story to another is more meaningful (both status wise and, as we see later, cost wise) as it occurs closer to the top of the building. We will return to this point in Propositions 1, 6, and 10 as well as the empirical section.
implies that, while j always generates a greater status than i, its relative status drops, ceteris paribus, as more stories are added to the building. From the latter, however, it follows that the relative status function is sensitive to "irrelevant alternatives:" while the choice between any two given stories is independent of the total number of stories in the building, the attained Relative L&J Status is clearly affected. 
Empirical Test
We propose an empirical model to test the properties of the Relative Lakoffian Status function and the Shapley solution discussed in the previous sections. Following volumes of literature on housing price we assume that house prices follow a log normal distribution (see, for example, Case and Shiller, 1989) . We specify a hedonic housing price model such that 21 This implies that, in essence, two factors affect the relative status attained by any story: its distance from the lower story to which it is compared and its distance from the top (calculated by the number of stories). 22 That is, the number of stories above and below a given floor directly affects the Relative L&J Status it generates.
(8)
where P k is the unit price of a condominium housing located on the kth floor of the building, k is the floor level, X is a vector of common building characteristics shared by condominium in all floor levels, such as number of stories in the building, Y is a vector of time invariant hedonic characteristics of the condominium, ( ) Z t is a vector of time varying factors that may reflect the time trend in the housing market, and ε is iid normally distributed residuals.
Following Blinder (1973) , we propose a structure estimate of our tests for Shapley solution for the allocation of the land and construction costs, such that
where j > i, and ω = ε j − ε i , which follows iid normal distribution. Equation (37) can be re-arranged as
. The results from model 3 and 4 support proposition 3 that the price difference between floors j and j + 1 increases monotonically with j for higher stories, ceteris paribus. All these tests are significant at 1% level. Table 2 presents a set of extended empirical tests such that price ratios between floors i and j increases with ( 
Summary
We apply the Shapley value approach for allocating the land and construction cost among the stories of a building. We also develop a status function of which properties align with Lakoff and Johnson (1980) imperative contribution to the perception of the terms "up"
and "down."
According to the proposed cost allocation mechanism, each story's share in the total cost rises with its level in the building in a particular manner. We show, among other things: the conditions under which the ratio and the difference between the costs allocated to any two successive stories either rise or fall with an ascent to higher stories; that the land and construction cost allocated to any given story drops with the number of stories in the building (when total costs are increased proportionally); that the ratio and the difference between the cost allocated to any two stories drop with the number of stories in the building; and that that the ratio (difference) between the cost allocated to any two stories drops with (is independent of) the share of the fixed cost. (1), (6), and (7) 
From Equations (A3) and (A4), however, it is straightforward to see that if ,…,N, then both R(j,i,N) and D(j,i,N) increase ( 
Inequality (A8) may be further simplified into
Multiplying both sides of (A9) by ) 
Substituting j+1 and j for j and i, respectively, produces after reduction where the right-hand side of (A28) is the maximal value of the right-hand side of (A27).
Finally, note that the right-hand side of (A28) is smaller than the left-hand side of (A27), which thus implies that Inequality (A22) holds for all N and j>i, and hence that the ratio between the cost allocated to the j-th floor and that allocated to the i-th floor (j>i; i=1,…,N-1; j=2,…,N, j>i) 
